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isn't a different kind of rationality. 
The Nature and Limits of Authority, by Richard T. De George. Lawrence, 
University Press of Kansas, 1985, pp. 305, VIII, Paper, $12.95. 
LINWOOD URBAN, Swarthmore College. 
Authority has so often been abused that many long for a utopia in which there 
will be no need for authorities of any kind. Richard De George finds such visions 
attractive but does not succumb to their allures since he believes that some 
reliance on authority is the normal state for human beings. Our task is not to do 
away with authority, but to understand its forms. "A reasoned examination of 
the many kinds, uses, justifications, and limitations of authority will help us to 
revise what should be changed and to preserve what should be kept in the 
continuing public and private scrutiny of authority in our society" (10). 
The analysis can be roughly described as Aristotelian. Like Aristotle, De 
George not only provides a description and conceptual clarification of the way 
authority functions in our society, but also justifies authority by its ability to 
enhance the achievement of legitimate human goals. "The key to an appropriate 
defense against totalitarianism is not to argue against all authority but to distin-
guish the kinds and forms of authority and to allow only those that are appropriate 
for the activity involved. My defense of authority is minimalist ... in the sense 
of justifying authority only to the extent required in order to achieve the ends 
one wishes to attain" (285). 
De George initially describes an authority as a person or entity superior in 
some way to another. Within this broad characterization, he distinguishes between 
executive and non-executive authority. Executive authority carries with it the 
right to act on or for another, like a broker representing a client in the market, 
or the right to command, like an officer in the armed forces. Executive authority 
includes the legislative and judicial branches of the government as well as the 
executive branch, since both legislatures and judges have the authority to act 
and also to command. For similar reasons, parental authority is seen as a subclas-
sification of executive authority. 
Non-executive authority is distinguished from executive authority precisely in 
that it does not confer the right to command, or to act on or for another. Primary 
examples of it are the authority conferred by knowledge or competence. These 
two types of authority can be manifested by either teaching or example. De 
George argues that no person has a right to executive authority solely on the 
ground that he or she is an epistemic authority. Individuals may be chosen for 
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executive authority primarily on the grounds of their epistemic authority, as, for 
example, a justice of the Supreme Court might be chosen for his knowledge of 
the law. Still, that knowledge, no matter how extensive and deep, does not, in 
itself, give any individual the right to sit on the judicial bench. 
These broad general classifications allow De George to classify and compare 
a wide range of special authorities in our society. Doctors, teachers, police, 
clergy, as well as parents and experts in various fields of endeavor, are given 
insightful, if not always lengthy, discussion. More extensive is De George's 
discussion of authority in the public sectors of government and the market place, 
and the private realms of morality, religion, and the university. This book is 
noteworthy not only for its scope but also for its careful reasoning and depth of 
analysis. Its exposition is learned as well as clear, and its arguments impressive. 
It sets a high standard that will not easily be surpassed. Its defense of a liberal 
perspective is especially attractive in an age vacillating between anarchy and 
totalitarianism. 
Readers of Faith and Philosophy will be particularly interested in De George's 
treatment of authority in morality and in religion. While De George gives attention 
to the justification and limitations of the epistemic authority of religious leaders, 
he is more concerned with the possible abuses of executive religious authority. 
As noted, his general principle is to endorse only so much executive authority 
as needed to achieve the legitimate goals of the practice. He applies this principle 
effectively to executive authority within the university, arguing that there execu-
tive authority is justified only insofar as the epistemic goals of the university 
are served. But when he discusses limitations on executive religious authority, 
De George goes beyond the issue of aims to his more basic distinction between 
religion and morality. It is in the context of a discussion of the Divine Command 
Theory of morality that he develops the controversial thesis that there is no 
legitimate executive moral authority. He concludes that it is untenable to hold 
that whatever God wills is right solely because he wills it, and on this basis 
makes the further claim that no moral injunction is ever solely the product of 
executive decision. "Executive religious authority does not become, except indi-
rectly, executive moral authority" (238). "Because actions are not made moral 
or immoral by anyone's fiat, they are not made so by the fact of any church's 
fiat" (238). Hence the late medieval claim that "The Pope's error makes right" 
must be mistaken. 
A second limitation placed on executive religious authority is that such authority 
extends legitimately only to those who are members of the particular religion. 
De George holds that no church or religious perspective has the right to compel 
those outside the particular faith to adopt its beliefs and practices. Drawing on 
a traditional distinction between the compulsion of reason and the voluntary 
character of religious faith, De George concludes that, since religions nowadays 
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see themselves as grounded in voluntary decision and not in the proofs of reason, 
tolerance of others who make commitments different from one's own is morally 
required. 
This conclusion has implications for distinguishing between moral and religious 
practices. Since morality is universally binding on all, prescriptions that are 
binding only on a particular body of believers cannot legitimately be considered 
moral injunctions. De George gives the dietary laws of the Hebrew Scriptures 
as examples of religious rules as distinct from moral ones. He is more interested 
in establishing general principles than in ruling on particular disputes. However, 
a discussion of the application of these principles to the contemporary controversy 
over the morality of abortion would have been especially illuminating, since on 
this issue there are vast disagreements among the contending parties. How far 
ought we go in ruling that an issue is not a moral issue but a religious one, in 
the face of substantial disagreement? De George does not fully discuss this 
controversial issue, but the fact that he leads us to raise it in this new way is a 
strength and not a weakness of his study. 
Evolution and Creation, ed. Ernan McMullin. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1985. Pp. xv and 307. $24.96. 
HOWARD J. V AN TILL, Calvin College. 
We have come to have high expectations of Eman McMullin, and in this volume 
we are not disappointed. McMullin introduces this collection of essays (most of 
them presented at the Conference on Creation and Evolution at the University 
of Notre Dame, March, 1983) with an historical overview of the concepts of 
creation and evolution. After discussing several early Greek cosmogonies, 
McMullin notes that while there was no theory of evolutionary mechanisms in 
early Greek thought, the basic idea of evolution was widely accepted. 
Although the creation narratives found in Genesis played important roles in 
Hebrew covenantal history, it was Christianity, according to McMullin, that 
developed the creation concept into a creation doctrine by its engagement with 
Greek metaphysical thought. This point is amply demonstrated and related to 
the idea of evolution by an extended review of the contributions of Augustine 
(whose concept of "seed-principles" was open to the idea of evolution) and 
Aquinas (whose accommodation principle of biblical interpretation left room for 
incorporating the science of the day into a Christian worldview). 
The modem concept of evolution is traced back to Descartes' "genetic" concept 
of the world's formative history. According to McMullin, Descartes was appa-
